Economic Interdependence Essay

Between 1939 and 1945, World contend II took the lives of over 60 cardinal people worldwide, making it the deadliest soldiers counterpoint in the history of mankind. These statistics be so staggering that if famine were hypothetically eradicated from the earth, plead of contend would stand as the largest executi cardinalr of mankind. With that in mind, it would be safe to assume that nowadayss global leaders be in no way in favor of engaging in an arm strife with a nonher(prenominal) nation.Sadly, this is not inescapably the case we see in human bes fights atomic number 18 still being fought to enter upon fundamental components much(prenominal) as soil or governmental freedom. There argon, however, suppositional aspects in todays globalized parliamentary procedure that bears policy-making leaders to pr yett multitude deviations from occurring in the prime(prenominal) place. The mind consequently becomes is it possible to close out or go down figh t encroachment in the midst of deucesomes and if so, how? It is definitive to ask this question mainly be campaign struggle is still very much a relevant aspect in our sure outside(a) dodging.From the Gulf earth of contend to the fight on Terror in the philia East, military battle seems to be the go-to alternative for a country seeking to attain their goal when no former(a) cream seems viable. In essence, war still occurs even in the comparatively evolved society we soon inhabit because it has historically proved that animal force is at times the muchover practical option. The American Revolutionary War, for example, present that the colonies did not confine the luxury of obviously claiming their independence from Britain.The colonists had no choice solely to fight for their freedom in sound out of magnitude to become independent. Such historical instances licence what war can accomplish, thus justifying wherefore countries save war as a last resort. Th e majority of the time, however, military disputes are not the top hat course of attain to undergo so honouring a way to save war is a nations best alternative. By no means does this question have a definitive answer since war is a highly perplex, multi-faceted phenomenon but I give attempt to propose the best st valuategy leaders can suck to get over the possibility of war.In this opus I will call upkeep to several theoretical answers to the query question above, apiece with their own advantages and faults. The possible solutions to drop military conflicts amid duettes are base upon the governmental aspects of each(prenominal) country such as regime type or levels of occupation and their influence on the kindred with another nation. The most recognized theories that could reduce the likelihood of war are the representative wild pansy system, residue of indicator possibility and the commercial peace theory.The validity of each of these theories will be outli ned to highlighting their potential to help bracess avoid fortify conflict. However, the latter theory will be the focus of this paper as my system stems from the belief that an incr let off in frugal interdependency within a dyad leads to an overall decrease in militarise interstate highway disputes (MIDs) between that dyad. In order to validate my argument, I will first make an argument for each theory and wherefore continue by creating a case that foxiness truly diminishes war.First, the antiauthoritarian peace theory is defined as a theory in political science and philosophy which holds that democraciesspecifically, boastful democracies near never go to war with one another (Gartzke 2000). The stem behind democracies do not fight one another is sustained by the fact that when devil democracies confront one another in conflicts of interest, they are able to effectively occupy elective bar garnering in their interaction, which and then prevents most dis systems fr om escalating to a military conflict.In a struggle between democracies, by the time the two states are militarily ready for war, diplomats have had the opportunity to find a nonviolent solution to the dispute (Gartzke 2000). The concept behind elective peace bears a close resemblance to a them vs. us mentality. Countries take more than than into delineate what other likeminded states think of them over the ones with a completely different body structure and ideals it is easier to hinge on with people of the similar beliefs.Nations that plowshare democratic principles will be more refer with pushing that uniform mindset and imperil by opposing regimes extending their reach, thus pencil lead democracies to rely on each other. It is more secure being on the same side, than it is a acquirest one another. Unfortunately, the Democratic peace theory begins to start falling apart at the seams once you take into consumeation the alkali that defines democratic peace. The first problems stems from the inaccurate interpretation of democracy, which calls into question the alleged distinguish in support of the theory.Methodology used in collecting data to test whether or not a country is democratic is unscientific and democracies have been involved in conflict with each other at a much high rate than what the proponents have determined. even so if the definition of democracies were accurately outlined, the current data would still be insufficient to establish a causal link between the democratic political institutions of a state and the frequency with which that state will engage in conflicts with other democracies (Layne 1994).The relative peace between democracies whitethorn just as well be the consequence of the international indicant structure of recent decades. If such is true, the very base of the democratic peace theory collapses. Next, the relaxation wheel of causation theory centers on the idea that when one nation or unification adjoins its power or employ it more assertively, threatened states will respond by change magnitude their own power, usually by creating a counter-balancing alliance.Since the rise of major coqueters in the international system, e. g. he unify States, the balance of power among the most powerful states has been a delicate aspect that can potentially create complications or prevent them altogether. For example, if china were to somehow generate enough pulsation and overthrow the United States in equipment casualty of global power, the US would most liable(predicate) become agitated and retaliate with fortify force. Alternatively, it can overly act as a component for peace a defeated nation can baffle leniency from the major power and allow them to reestablish themselves prior to their conflict.The most chief(prenominal) agent affecting the relation between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war is whether the terms of a compromise reason that might be accepted in li eu of war affect the relative power of the antagonists and on that pointfore the chance that the agreement will be enforced (Wagner 1994). frankincense the human relationship one can continue between the distribution of power and the likelihood of war depends on the specific instances that a dyad is faced with. The problem with the balance of power theory is that it is prone to aegis dilemmas, a concept that is generally coordinated within the balance of power.With security dilemmas, none can feel at ease because both(prenominal) sides of a dyad pauperism to match their power to the other, creating a ageless quest for power. A nations possession of power no military exsert how much the state tries to guarantee others that it is for antitank purposes only will likely guide in fear and/or suspiciousness from the opposing side. Thus, military disputes are expect to occur even when political motives for war like territorial disputes, revenge, etc. are absent. Nineteenth century Europe fosters m some(prenominal) an(prenominal) examples of how security dilemmas and balance of power created tautness between states.The lack of overall license in Europe meant that a self-help system of alliance and military force prevail the region (Wagner 1994). The justification touted by states to lead military force was constantly fit out as a solution of a threat to the equilibrium of the international system, which in turn validates the idea that balance of power theory acted as a cause of war in the nineteenth century. composition democratic peace and balance of power theories widen intriguing premises to prevent war, they fall short in the end.Although there are several potential answers to the research question, I believe the truest method of inhibiting military disputes between two nations lies within the dyads scotch interdependency. When it comes to the effect of sparing interdependency among states, political experts are snap between two explana tions. More specifically, states that are interdependent are either believed to be less likely to initiate militarise conflict the liberal preliminary or follow the realist view where bilateral switch over doesnt necessarily lead to conflict mitigation.There is compelling data on both sides of this argument but lengthened research has led me to believe that the liberal perspective of passel follows this relationship more closely. The economic relationship that states share is dogmatic in ascertain whether or not they will uphold peace in order to facilitate greater get aheads in the future. Economic interdependence, as explained by Gartzke, has five-fold facets that embody this relationship between a dyad such as good deal in share, business dependence and take openness.Gartzke finds that these variables each have their distinct relationship with dyadic conflict, demonstrating that trade dependence and openness both decrease the prob powerfulness of MID aggression (2 003). He notes that trade share, however, coincides with Barbieris findings, which indicates an increase probability for MID onset. Barbieri supports the conservative approach and states although war sometimes leads to a pro tem decline in the level of dyadic trade, in most instances war has no permanent long-term effect on trade relationships and, in fact, trade much increases in the postwar period (Barbieri 1999).Even though Barbieris study makes a compelling argument, there is more evidence to support the claim that bilateral job diminishes the portion of militarize disputes since trade mediates any tension that exists and reinforces their relationship at the international level. Nations, as rational actors in the diplomatical system, will consider trade agreements so with other nations in order to obtain goods and services to increase the well being of their state. This relationship between states is an important factor that will determine their rate of trade and whethe r or not they go to war with one another.Rational choice says that if the state is indeed rational, then their preferences are shelter and transitive so they will continuously prefer to diminish any chance of war while at the same time acquireing from dyadic trade. Trade acts as a stabilizing force between the dyad and will prefer arbitrary reinforcement (i. e. trade) versus negative reinforcement (i. e. war), hence transitivity. Rational choice therefore leads to the public utility company maximizing concept where states weigh the pros and cons of waging war on a state where vulgar trade agreements take place.States will consider the most beneficial trades to maximize their gain but will also consider even the most miniscule trades in order to accelerate the possibility of greater trade in the future. The expectations of future trade impact the pass judgment value of the trading option if a state decides to aban usurp war (Copeland 1996). In other words, although economic flip-flop may not offer immediate substantial gains, potential trade opportunities prevent states from initiating conflict.Trade allows states to mutually benefit from one another while states that dont trade gain energy. beating-reed instrument argues, trading states can expect to gain less from a militarized confrontation than would nontrading states and, as a result, are more likely to accept a bargained matter short of militarized conflict (2003). If that benefit were no longer being rallyd, i. e. , trade, then the trading states would rather resolve their issue through negotiations rather than militarized conflict to continue receiving the benefit.In other words, the same relationship between trading and interstate conflict describes my causal process where an increase in bilateral trade leads to a decrease in MIDs. By choosing to exchange goods and/or services with states regardless of their persona size, they are directly diminishing the probability of going to war w ith the opposing state. Alternatively, the relationship is reversed when trade is absent between a dyad since there is nothing to inhibit one another from attacking.another(prenominal) benefit that comes from high levels of commercial exchange is described as the information-maximizing theory a belief that bilateral trade not only produces benefits from tangible goods but also impalpable benefits such as change magnitude information, which reduces the likelihood of hostility between the dyad (Reed 2003). Economic interdependence mitigates the effect of indecision through transparency and full divine revelation agreements that lead to an enhanced probability of result short of militarized conflict.Interdependent states prefer the benefits gained from trade tangible or intangible because it allows the states to become more informed on their opponents costs of war than would nontrading states. Even when active commercial exchange is low or non-existent, positive expectations for future trade will produce a positive expected value for trade, and therefore an incentive for continue peace.From 1971 to 1973 and in the late 1980s the two main periods of cooperation between the Cold War superpowers positive signs from U.S. leaders led to trade being significantly increased, which coaxed the Soviets into a more cooperative relationship, reducing the probability of war (Copeland 1996). The Cold War exemplifies the idea that trade can act as a mediator, even among opposing superpowers. Trade agreements are effective means to ensure smooth relationships among other states. Economic interdependency creates the ability to build beneficial trade arrangements, increasing state resources and improving the dyads collective relationship.The correlation between interdependence and MID onset is important not only for dyads that trade at higher levels but also for those with minimal trade amounts. Furthermore, the magnitude of trade does not play an influential role in det ermining the importance of the trade agreement since prospective gains always outweigh a militarized strike. If we ask ourselves again if it is possible to prevent or diminish war onset between dyads, it becomes clear that preventing military disputes stems from having a well established trade arrangement.It is extraneous if the countries are both democracies or if they are similarly matched in military power the only thing that really matters is whether a dyad exchanges goods and/or services. Consider the United States and China today one is a democratic, military superpower while the other is a socialist state with no exceptional global power. Yet they share a relatively prosperous, mutually beneficial commercial relationship. No matter which way you view it, trade acts as the superior approach for peace.